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INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF HEDGES
— by Neil E. Harl*
After aggressively pressing the position that commodity
hedges, including short sales, produced capital gain or loss
treatment,1  IRS lost a key decision on June 17, 1993.2
Now, the Department of the Treasury in temporary and
proposed regulations, has abandoned its previous position
and agrees that gains and losses from most hedging
transactions are considered to be ordinary gains and losses.3
Under the authority of Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm'r,4
IRS had contended that such losses were capital in nature
which could offset capital gains and, for individuals, up to
$3,000 of ordinary income.5  The temporary and proposed
regulations are very good news for those hedging
commodities and essentially confirm the position adopted
in the FNMA case.6
FNMA
In the FNMA case, the Federal National Mortgage
Association had hedged debentures and mortgages with
short sales of U.S. Treasury securities.  IRS objected, citing
Arkansas Best Corp.,7 for the proposition that the gains and
losses were properly from capital transactions.
The Tax Court held that the FNMA transactions were
hedges and that closing out the hedges resulted in ordinary
gains and losses.  The court noted that the transactions were
meant to offset the risk of changes in interest rates and
were, therefore, true hedges.  In response to the IRS
argument that FNMA had not offset all of its risk, an
argument sometimes made with commodity futures
transactions, the court said:
"A taxpayer is not required to negate its entire risk,
nor must it hedge every transaction in order to lock in a
particular return, since hedges by their very nature are
meant to avoid risk of loss (similar to insurance), but
not necessarily all risk, to which a taxpayer is
exposed."
In deciding that the losses on the hedges were ordinary
losses rather than capital losses, the court concluded that
short positions as well as long positions could reduce price
risk and that it was not necessary for ordinary gain or loss
treatment  for the hedge to be in the same asset that the
taxpayer owns or intends to acquire.  The court noted that,
for the hedging position to be eligible for ordinary gain or
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loss treatment, the hedging transactions must have been
integrally related to the purchasing and holding of the assets
hedged.  In the FNMA case, the court concluded that the
hedges bore a close enough relationship to FNMA's
mortgages to be excluded from the definition of a capital
asset.8
New regulations
The temporary and proposed regulations are published
in three parts.  The first part contains temporary regulations
covering transactions involving interest-rate, currency and
price risks.9  To receive ordinary loss treatment for hedges
entered into on or after January 1, 1994, the regulations
require taxpayers to identify hedges when entered into,
along with the item or items hedged.10  This provision is
designed to discourage taxpayers from declaring
transactions to be hedges after the arrangement can be seen
likely to produce losses.
Under the second set of proposed regulations, specific
guidelines are provided for taxpayers to follow in
identifying hedges as the hedge transctions are entered
into.11
The final set of regulations governs when gains and
losses are to be reported.12  Taxpayers other than farmers
and other small businesses are generally requried to take a
gain or loss from a hedge into account in the same period as
the income, deductions, gain or loss is reported on the item
being hedged.13  For farm and small business taxpayers on
the cash method of accounting, the simpler methods
previously used can continue to govern reporting of hedge
transactions if the taxpayer has no more than $5,000,000 of
gross receipts.14
The new regulations do not apply to Section 1231 assets
(used in a trade or business) or capital assets.15
FOOTNOTES
1 See, e.g., Letter from Stuart L. Brown, Associate Chief
Counsel, (Domestic), IRS, to Henry Bahn, U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, dated January 27, 1993, regarding the
Options Pilot Program. See Harl, Agricultual Law §
27.03[8][d] (1993); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
4.02[6] (1993).
2 Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. No.
36 (1993).
3 T.D. 8493, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2T.
4 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
5 I.R.C. § 1211.
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*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
6 See n. 2 supra.
7 See n. 4 supra.
8 See I.R.C. § 1221.
9 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2T.
10 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2T.
11 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2.
12 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4.
13 Id.
14 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(a)(1).  See I.R.C. § 448(c).
15 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2T(b)(2).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had defaulted on
loans secured by real property and the mortgage had been
foreclosed and the property sold. The period of redemption
had expired and all that was left to complete the transfer of
title was a judicial confirmation of the sale. Before this
could occur, the debtors filed for bankruptcy. The court held
that the automatic stay barred the judicial confirmation of
the sale until the creditor obtained relief from the automatic
stay. U.S. v. Molitor, 157 B.R. 427 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3]*
ANNUITY. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor
sold some non-exempt assets and purchased three annuity
contracts. The debtor claimed the three contracts as exempt
under Calif. Code of Civ. Proc. § 704.100(c). The court held
that the annuity contracts were not eligible for the
exemption because the annuities did not represent benefit
payments from matured life insurance policies. In re
Pikush, 157 B.R. 155 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption under Section 522(f) and sought to avoid judicial
liens which impaired the exemption. The liens against the
house included a first priority unavoidable mortgage, four
next priority judicial liens and a sixth priority unavoidable
tax lien. The total of the liens substantially exceeded the
value of the house. The creditor argued that because the first
and sixth priority liens were unavoidable and exceeded the
value of the house, the judicial liens did not impair the
exemption. The court held that the impairment occurred
when the liens, taken in order of priority, first exceeded the
value of the house less the exemption amount; however, the
impairment only affected the priority of the liens by placing
the debtor’s exemption amount in the priority scheme.
Because the IRS lien could not be affected by the change in
priority, the last judicial lien was bifurcated into a seventh
priority portion equal to the exemption amount. The affect
of this solution is that (1) no actual avoidance of a lien
occurs but the debtor receives the exemption amount upon
sale of the collateral and (2) the lien which caused the total
of liens to exceed the value of the exempt property less the
exemption amount became unsecured by the exemption
amount. In re Bellenoit, 157 B.R. 185 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1992).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor had claimed a homestead
exemption under Cal. Code of Civil Proc. § 703.140. The
trustee objected to the exemption because the bankruptcy
case was not an attempt to sell the residence to enforce a
money judgment. The court held that because the
Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the status as hypothetical
creditor, the exemption was allowed in a bankruptcy case.
In re Norman, 157 B.R. 460 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1993).
IRA. The debtor opened an IRA in 1987 and filed for
bankruptcy in 1992, claiming the IRA as exempt. The
debtor was 45 years old and was facing unemployment due
to a shutdown of the company for which the debtor worked.
The court found that the debtor’s income just exceeded the
debtor’s expenses but after unemployment, the expenses
would exceed income. However, because the debtor had
never made withdrawals from the IRA and that
demonstrated that the debtor did not need all of the account
for living expenses, the court held that half of the account
must be turned over to the trustee. The court also ordered
the debtor and trustee to share in the cost of the federal
taxes and penalties resulting from the early withdrawal from
the IRS. In re Metzner, 157 B.R. 332 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1993).
The debtor owned two IRA’s, one for $2,000 and one
for $5,500, which the debtor claimed as exempt. The debtor
was 58 years old and on medical leave for stress. The debtor
was planning to separate from her spouse and was under a
threat of losing her job. The debtor had more debt payments
and personal expenses than would be covered by payments
from the IRAs. The court held that only the $2,000 IRA was
not reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support and not
exempt. The debtor was required to pay any taxes and
penalties resulting from the early withdrawal of funds from
the IRA. In re Bogart, 157 B.R. 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1993).
OBJECTIONS. The debtor claimed real property as
exempt in the bankruptcy petition in April 1992 but did not
provide any statutory basis for the exemption. In September
1992, the debtor amended the exemption schedules to
include an automobile but did not otherwise amend the
exemptions. The trustee filed an objection to the real
property exemption in September 1992, arguing that the
objection should be allowed because it was made within 30
days after an amendment to the exemptions. The court held
that the objection was untimely because the amendment did
not change the exemption claim for the real property. The
